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codified this constitutional requirement in laws specifically designating
the defendant's age as a mitigating
factor in capital cases. Moreover, the
determinations required by juvenile
transfer statutes to certify a juvenile
for trial as an adult ensure individualized consideration of the maturity
and moral responsibility of sixteen
and seventeen year-old offenders before they are even held to stand trial
as adults.
[d. at 2978.
Similarly, the Court rejected Stanford's reliance on public opinion polls,
the views of public interest groups and
the poSitions of professional associations
as indicia ofa national consensus, declaring them insufficient foundations on
which to rest constitutional law. "A ...
national consensus so broad, so clear
and so enduring as to justify a permanent
prohibition upon all units of democratic
government must appear in the operative acts (laws and application of laws)
that the people have approved." [d. at
2979.
Finally, the Court deemed it unnecessary to conduct a proportionality test: to .
examine whether "there is a disproportion between the punishment imposed
and the defendant's blameworthiness."
[d. at 2980. This test is used only where
there is objective evidence of a societal
consensus against the penalty; no such
evidence existed in this case. [d.
In a strong dissent, Justice Brennan
criticized the Court's reliance on legislative enactments to determine that the
capital punishment of sixteen or seventeen year old offenders did not offend
'''evolving standards of decency...· [d. at
2982 (quoting Trop v. Dulles) This approach returned to the task of defining
eighth amendment protection to the very
political majorities the framers sought to
deny such power. '''One's right to life,
liberty, and property, . . . and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome
of no elections.'" [d. at 2987 (quoting
West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319U.S. 624, 638 (1943)). Furthermore,
the dissent indicated that the plurality's
discussion of state laws was distorted
since it failed to account for the fifteen
states (and the District of Columbia)
which do not authorize capital punishment at all. [d. at 2982-83.
Justice Brennan also characterized the
Court's review of legislative enactments
to establish a national consensus as incomplete. He argued that the rare application of the death sentence for youthful
offenders, the decisions of respected
organizations in relevant fields that the
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penalty was unacceptable, and its rejection by governments around the world,
were strong indications that the execution of adolescents violated contemporary standards of decency and should
have been included in the Court's
analysis. [d. at 2984-85.
The dissent criticized the plurality's
refusal to conduct proportionality analysis. "There can be no doubt at this point
in our constitutional history that the
eighth amendment forbids punishment
that is wholly disproportionate to the
blameworthiness of the offender." [d. at
2987. The dissent noted that in American
society, juveniles are treated differently
from adults. As a class, they do not have
the level of maturation and responsibility
presumed in adults. "'The reasons why
juveniles are not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also
explain why their irresponsible conduct
is not as morally reprehensible as that of
an adult. ..• [d. at 2988 (quoting 7bompsonv. Oklahoma, 487 U.S._, 108S.Ct,
2687,2699 (1988)). In Brennan's view,
"[j]uveniles very generally lack that degree of blameworthiness that is ... a constitutional prerequisite for the imposition of capital punishment under our
precedents concerning the eighth
amendment proportionality principle."
[d. at 2992.
In a plurality opinion, the United
States Supreme Court ruled that the imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were sixteen or seventeen years
old at the time they committed their
crimes did not violate the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment, because such penalty was not considered cruel and unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was
adopted, and no national consensus
against the execution of such youthful
offenders had been established.
-Mary Jo Murphy
Gray v. State: COURT UPHELD
TRlALJUDGE'S DISCRETION IN
REFUSING TO REQUIRE A
PROSECUTOR TO TESTIFY OR BE
CROSS-EXAMINED FOR ALLEGED
DISCRIMINATION IN SELECTING
JURORS
In Gray v. State, 317 Md. 250, 562 A.2d
1278 (1989), the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that a prosecutor is not
required to testify under oath or be subjected to cross-examination when offering non-discriminatory explanations for
the striking of black venire persons from
the jury panel.
Isaac Gray, a black male, \!las tried in
the Circuit Court for Howard County for
the first degree rape of a white woman.

Upon completion of the jury selection
process, Gray moved for a mistrial, alleging that since the prosecutor had used
four of his peremptory challenges to
strike black jurors from the panel, the
state must advance an explanation for
these challenges. [d. at 252-53, 562 A.2d
at 1279. Relying on Swain v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 202 (1965), the trial judge held
that a prosecutor was not required to
give explanations for the exercise of peremptory challenges. Gray, 317 Md. at
253 n.2, 562 A.2d at 1279 n.2. Despite
the court's ruling, the prosecutor volunteered a non-discriminatory reason for
one of his strikes and noted that the jury,
as impaneled, included one black juror
and one black alternate juror. [d. at 253,
562 A.2d at 1280. The trial judge denied
the defendant's motion and Gray was
subsequently convicted.
Gray filed a motion for a new trial. At
the hearing, Gray argued that Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), decided
after Gray's trial on the merits, was applicable to the facts of his case. Gray, 317
Md. at 253, 562 A.2d at 1280. Batson
held that where the totality of the circumstances surrounding a prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges established a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the burden was on the state to
justify the challenges with a non-discriminatory explanation. Gray argued
that a prima facie showing had been
established and, therefore, the state was
required to provide a racially neutral reason for the challenge. The prosecutor
denied the allegations of discrimination
and stated his reasons for striking each of
the black jurors. The trial judge denied
the motion for a new trial, based on his
belief that Batson was not meant to be
applied retroactively, and that, notwithstanding Batson, the ratio of black
jurors to the other jurors exceeded the
ratio of blacks to all persons living in the
county at that time. [d. at 253-54, 562
A.2d at 1280.
On appeal, the court of special appeals
vacated the judgment and remanded the
case for a determination of whether Gray
had established a prima facie showing of
racial discrimination, and, if so, whether
the state had sufficiently rebutted the
showing, in accord with the two-part test
of Batson. [d. at 254,562 A.2d at 1280. At
this hearing, counsel for the defendant
requested, pursuant to a witness subpoena which had been served on the
prosecutor, that the prosecutor be
placed under oath before giving his reasons for his jury strikes and that while
under oath, he be subject to cross-examination. Gray argued that there was a
guaranteed right to an adversarial hear-

ing under the principles of due process,
equal protection and effective assistance
of counsel. Id. The prosecution replied
that the purpose of the hearing was to
permit the state to explain its use of the
challenges and that under these circumstances it was not necessary to require an
oath or cross-examination. The trial
judge agreed and quashed the subpoena.
Id.
The trial judge ruled that no prima
facie case of racial discrimination had
been established. Id. In the interest of
prudence, however, the court addressed
the second step of the Batson test (that
the state must proffer a non-discriminatory explanation for the exercise of the
challenge) and found the prosecutor's
explanation would have been sufficient if
a prima facie showing had been made. Id.
Gray again appealed, and this time the
court of special appeals upheld the lower
court, finding that Gray had not shown
that the ruling of the trial court had been
clearly erroneous. Gray petitioned the
court of appeals for certiorari, raising
two issues: 1) whether "[t]he trial court
erred in ruling that the defense failed to
establish a prima facie showing of racial
discrimination in the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges"; and 2)
whether "[t]he trial court erred in refusing to require the prosecutor to testify
under oath and be subject to crossexamination." Id. at 255, 562 A.2d at
1281.
Initially, the Court of Appeals of Maryland assumed that the defendants had
established a prima facie case of racial
discrimination and, therefore, moved
directly to the second issue: whether the
prosecutor should be required to testify
under oath and be subject to crossexamination. /d. at 256, 562 A.2d at
1281. The court noted that in Batson the
Supreme Court refused to specify procedures to be followed when a defendant
objected to a prosecutor's challenges. Id.
at 256-57, 562A.2dat 1281. The majority
of courts that have faced the issue, however, left the procedure to the trial
judge's discretion. The Gray court
deemed this to be the better view, especially in light of the broad variety of
circumstances under which a prosecutor
may be required to offer an explanation
and that the trial judge is to be accorded
broad discretion in conducting a trial. Id.
The court noted, however, one limitation on the discretion of the trial judge:
only a "compelling justification" would
justify an ex parte proceeding sufficient
to meet the dictates of Batson; under
"normal" circumstances an adversary
proceeding should be utilized to
consider Batson challenges. Id. at 25758,562 A.2d at 1282.

The court held the justifications offered by the defense in support of administration of an oath to the prosecutor
were insufficient to remove the decision
from the discretion of the trial judge. All
attorneys are officers of the court, bound
by Maryland Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct and "[a] trial judge calling upon the prosecutor to explain his
challenges has every right to expect total
candor without resorting to the administration of an oath." Id. at 258, 562 A.2d
at 1282.
Examining the defendant'S right to
cross-examine the prosecutor, the court
noted "[i]n our adversary system of justice, cross-examination enjoys an exalted
position." Id. at 258-59, 562A.2d at 1282.
The court held that a judge faced with a
request for a cross-examination in a Batson situation has the discretion to grant
the request, but only after a careful
weighing of all the relevant factors in that
particular case. Id. at 259, 562 A.2d at
1282. The court, however, made clear
that the favored procedure under these
circumstances is not a formal adversary
proceeding but rather a relatively informal proceeding similar to that which
occurs during the voir dire examination
of a juror at the bench. Id.
Finally, the court opined that in a posttrial hearing, as opposed to a hearing at
the trial level, factors such as the passage
of time and impairment of memory may
require an explanation under oath and
cross-examination.Id. at261, 562A.2dat
1284. On the facts before the court,
however, the court held that the actions
of the trial court did not amount to an
abuse of discretion. Id.
The decision of the court of appeals in
Gray has left the door open for trial
judges to use the formalities and additional safeguards afforded by a formal
adversarial proceeding when it is faced
with a Batson allegation of discrimination in the selection of a jury. More
importantly, the Gray decision preserves the discretionary power of the
trial judge to determine the proceeding
that is best suited to the circumstances of
the particular case before the court.
-Greg Swain
Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz: PRESS
HAS COMMON lAW RIGHT OF
ACCESS TO AFFIDAVIT
SUPPORTING SEARCH WARRANTS
BETWEEN EXECUTION OF
WARRANTS AND INDICTMENT
In Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886
F.2d60 (4th Cir. 1989), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

held that the press's common law right of
access to a sealed affidavit supporting
search warrants during the interval between execution of the warrants and indictment was within the sound discretion of the judicial officer. As a result, in
certain circumstances, the press may
force the government to unseal warrant
papers which could expose continuing
criminal investigations.
On January 27, 1988, a federal magistrate issued three search warrants based
on the affidavit of an FBI agent,.and then
sealed the papers. After execution ofthe
warrants, the magistrate unsealed the
warrants and the returns, but left the affidavit sealed. On May 4, 1988, the Baltimore Sun Company (Sun) petitioned to
unseal the affidavit. However, the magistrate denied the Sun's petition concluding that the public interest in the investigation of crime would not be best served
by allowing the Sun to publish the affidavit. The Sun then sought a writ of mandamus from the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland to compel the magistrate to unseal the affidavit.
The government offered to disclose a redacted version of the affidavit, but the district court declined. Without examining
the affidavit, the district court agreed
with the magistrate's conclusion and
denied the Sun's petition. However,
while the Sun's appeal of the district
court's decision was pending, the magistrate unsealed the affidavit after indictments were returned.
After deciding that the affidavit was a
judicial record, the court noted the superior distinction between the first
amendment and common law rights of
access. Only upon a showing of a
"compelling government interest" and
proofthat the denialis "narrowly tailored
to serve that interest" maya court deny
the first amendment right of access. Id. at
64 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606
(1982». On the other hand, a court may
at its discretion deny the common law
right to access. Id.
The court began its analysis with the
question of whether the Sun had a first
amendment right of access to the affidavit. The court noted that the test for
making such a determination is: "I)
'whether the place and process have historically been open to the press and
general public,' and 2) 'whether public
access plays a significant positive role in
the functioning of the particular process
in question.'" Id. (quoting Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1,8-10
(1986». The court held that the Sun's
claim failed the first prong of the test
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